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FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit Summary, published at least once each
year, provides synopses of important recent environmental
Included are
decisions affecting the Fourth Circuit.
for the
Appeals
of
Court
States
United
the
by
decisions
Fourth Circuit, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions
that affect the Fourth Circuit. It does not cover every
environmental decision affecting the Fourth Circuit, but
only those cases that the editors believe to be of the most
interest to subscribers.

CLEAN WATER ACT

Friendsof the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 120
S. Ct. 693 (2000)
On June 12, 1992, Friends of the Earth, Inc. ("FOE") filed a citizen
suit against Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("Laidlaw") under the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"). In its lawsuit, FOE alleged that Laidlaw, the
owner of a wastewater treatment plant, was not in compliance with its
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. The
permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water, but limited the
discharge of pollutants. FOE alleged that Laidlaw was repeatedly
discharging mercury into the waterways that exceeded the limits set by the
permit.
In the district court, Laidlaw moved for summary judgment
arguing that FOE lacked standing. Laidlaw also filed a motion to dismiss.
The district court denied both motions and levied a civil penalty against
Laidlaw for $405,800.00, payable to the U.S. Treasury. The district court
declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw had achieved
substantial compliance with its permit since the initiation of the lawsuit.
FOE appealed the amount of the civil penalty to the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded
with instructions to dismiss the case. The Fourth Circuit found that the
case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit
and FOE did not appeal the denial of equitable relief. According to the
Fourth Circuit, awarding civil penalties payable to the U.S. Treasury
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would not redress any injuries suffered by FOE. The Fourth Circuit also
did not award attorneys' fees.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and held
that FOE had standing because civil penalties have a remedial effect to
deter future violations and, therefore,, redress. injuries suffered by FOE.
Additionally, the Supreme Court determined that the case was not moot
just because Laidlaw came into compliance after the initiation of the
lawsuit. 'The case would be rendered moot only if it was clear that
violations could not reasonably be expected to recur. The Supreme Court
also held that the Fourth Circuit wrongly considered the issue of attorneys'
fees because there was no order before it either awarding or denying
attorneys' fees.
CLEAN AIR ACT

State of Michigan v. EPA, 2000 WL 180650 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 2000) (per
curiam)
Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA promulgates National Ambient
Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"). States are then required to adopt State
Implementation Plans ("SIPs"), subject to EPA approval, detailing how
the NAAQS will be implemented, maintained, and enforced. Even after a
SIP has received EPA approval, the EPA may later require the SIP to be
revised; this is called a "SIP call." In 1998, the EPA promulgated a rule
requiring significant reductions of NO. in an effort to reduce the transport
of ozone pollution formed by NO. emissions. The rule required twentytwo states (including Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
and West Virginia) and the District of Columbia to revise their SIPs to
conform with the EPA's rule targeted at mitigating interstate transport of
ozone.
Shortly after the EPA promulgated the NOx SIP call, several of the
affected states filed petitions with the D.C. Circuit Court. A three-judge
panel issued its 2-1 opinion on March 3, 2000. The decision upheld
virtually all of the EPA's actions, resulting in a major victory for the EPA.
Among the issues decided, the court rejected the petitioners' claim that the
EPA could not issue a SIP call without first convening a transport
commission and that the EPA failed to make state-specific determination
of ozone pollution contribution.
In addition, the petitioners challenged the EPA's determination of
what constitutes "significant" contribution. The petitioners challenged the
EPA's determination of "significance" of contribution on four grounds: 1)
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the EPA acted contrary to past precedent; -2) the EPA improperly
considered costs of reduction in its determination; 3) the EPA improperly
imposed uniform NO. controls, regardless of each state's contribution; and
4) the EPA's determination violated the "non-delegation doctrine." In its
decision, the court rejected each of the petitioners' contentions and upheld
the EPA's determination of what constitutes "significant" contribution.
The petitioners did receive a small victory. First, the court vacated
the EPA's final rule with respect to three of the states-Georgia; Missouri,
and Wisconsin. Second, the court held that the EPA failed to give
adequate notice of the change in the definition of "electric generating
unit." Third, the court found in favor of one petitioner, Interstate Natural
Gas Association of America, and held that the EPA did not provide
adequate notice of a change in the control level assumed for large
stationary combustion engines.
CERCLA
Minyard Enterprises,Inc. v. Southeastern Chemical & Solvent, Co., 184
F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 1999)
Past and present owners of property sued Southeastern Chemical &
Solvent, Co. ("Southeastern") under CERCLA and South Carolina state
law for allegedly contaminating the property when it removed an
The district court awarded plaintiffs
underground storage tank.
$42,817.58, which equaled eighty percent of the past Response Costs and
eighty percent of future Response Costs. The district court also awarded
plaintiffs $200,000.00 with respect to their breach of contract and
negligence claims. Southeastern appealed contending, among other
things, that the $200,000.00 award was duplicative of the CERCLA
award.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld both awards. Section 114(b)
of CERCLA prohibits double recoveries; however, in the present case the
Fourth Circuit found that the two awards were meant to compensate the
plaintiffs for two separate and distinct harms. The $200,000.00 was
awarded in order to compensate the plaintiffs for diminution in value of
the property proximately caused by Southeastern's negligence. The
CERCLA award was to partially compensate the plaintiffs for past and
future Response Costs.
Southeastern also argued that it should not be held liable for
contribution for Response Costs because the plaintiffs did not expressly
allege for the recovery of Response Costs. However, the Fourth Circuit
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held that it was not error to hold Southeastern responsible for contribution
despite the plaintiffs' failure to request contribution. The Fourth Circuit
did find, however, that the burden of proving allocation of costs was
improperly placed upon Southeastern; instead, it was the plaintiffs' burden
to prove allocation. Therefore, the case was vacated and remanded with
respect to contribution.

